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I
INTRODUCTION
Arrest records play a significant role in today's society. Millions of arrest
records exist for Americans and an estimated nine million records are added
each year.' The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Criminal Justice estimated in 1968 that 52,000,000 records existed
and that from forty to fifty percent of the male population over the age of
eighteen would, at some time in their lives, be arrested for a nontraffic
offense. 2
The records reflect a multitude of offenses and alleged offenses and are
often incomplete, inaccurate or misleading.3 These records, however, are
used by law enforcement agencies, government entities, and even prospective
employers as a prime source of information about individuals. This note
focuses on the significance of arrest records as an influence on the exercise of
police discretion. The note defines the issues surrounding police use of arrest
records, addresses some of the concerns related to the use of such records
within the broader context of the norms of the criminal justice system, and
suggests areas for future study.
The popular and legal literature notes many examples of the deleterious
use by the police of the information contained in arrest records, at least with
respect to the individuals immortalized in such records. 4 Underlying this
literature are persistent questions regarding the propriety of retaining, dis-
seminating, and utilizing arrest records. The desire to ensure that the law
enforcement system does not use arrest records to contravene the accepted
norms of the criminal justice system must, of course, be balanced against the
Copyright © 1984 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. Neier, Introduction to T. BALLINGER, CLEAN SLATE 7 (1979).
2. See United States v. Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
3. Ballinger estimates that 65% of arrest records are incomplete or inaccurate. T. BALLINGER,
supra note 1, at 29.
4. For examples, see Davis, Records of Arrest and Conviction: A Comparative Study of Institutional
Abuse, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 863 (1980); Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAc. L.J. 20
(1972); Note, Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CORNELL L.Q. 470 (1971); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Right of Police to Retain Arrest Records, 49 N.C.L. REV. 509 (1971); When Nightmare of False
Arrest Comes True, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 1984, at 45.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
legitimate interests of police administrators in obtaining as much information
as possible about alleged offenders to maximize the effectiveness of their
departments.
Law enforcement agencies argue that the availability and use of arrest
records assist investigations and permit officers to have a broader under-
standing of the individual under investigation. Consequently, agencies claim
that the records are a legitimate tool for making distinctions in situations in
which full enforcement is not the standard. 5 In the absence of such informa-
tion, the claim is that police officers would either have to arrest everyone sus-
pected of an infraction or resort to other types of information, perhaps more
biased and less indicative of criminality, in deciding which suspects to arrest. 6
In addition, police agencies claim that these records are needed to combat
recidivism, especially by more mobile offenders, but the data supporting this
contention are scant. 7 Furthermore, these arguments implicitly assume that
records of arrest are valid predictors of criminal behavior.
The ways in which arrest records are used reflect the type of law enforce-
ment system employed in a society. Herbert Packer, in discussing various
possibilities for law enforcement systems, set forth the following as polar
models:
The Crime Control model sees the efficient, expeditious, and reliable screening and
disposition of persons suspected of crime as the control value to be served by the
criminal process. The Due Process model sees the function as limited by and
subordinate to the maintenance of the dignity and autonomy of the individual.8
In reality, the American law enforcement system does not fit exactly into
either model, but instead lies somewhere along a continuum between the two.
The rules chosen for the system help to shape its priorities and, in turn, force
the system to move closer to one or the other model.
Arrest records are one of many tools for law enforcement, and the more
extensive the tools, the more the system will resemble the Crime Control
model. Conversely, the more the tools of law enforcement agencies are
restricted, either legislatively or judicially, the greater will be the resemblance
to the Due Process model. The premise of this note is that arrest records are
an increasingly effective tool for law enforcement agencies and that,
5. See generally Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in
the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 561-62; Monroe v. Tielsch, 84 Wash. 2d 217, 219, 525
P.2d 250, 251 (1974).
6. See Goldstein, supra note 5, at 561-62.
7. SeeJ. MURPHY, ARREST BY POLICE COMPUTER 7 (1975).
8. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 238,
239 (1966). One author sees these models as
competing ideological visions of how our system serves criminal procedurse's functions. Both
models describe a set of values, beliefs, attitudes, and ideas about our criminal justice system
that are held by many legal actors within the system and that are reflected in some of its institu-
tions and practices . . . . [B]oth ideological models provide a source for legitimate arguments
that courts may use to shape legal doctrine in criminal procedure.
Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies,
72 GEO. L.J. 185, 188-89 (1983).
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depending upon the model of preference, some controls over the use of these
records may be necessary.
The proper use of arrest records in the exercise of police discretion is
important since the problems associated with the use of such records are
likely to be exacerbated by the modernization and computerization of the
criminal recordkeeping system. The National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) is already the depository of millions of records, and an increasing
number of police departments are tying into its system.9 One court has
referred to the mushrooming police records as a system "out of effective con-
trol," especially in light of the FBI's failure to ensure the accuracy of the infor-
mation.' 0 Furthermore, the widespread use of arrest files by the police may
be viewed as a form of "dependency."'' If police personnel can readily
obtain information relating to an individual's arrest history, that information
is likely to play a greater role in the exercise of discretion in the field. As a
result, the risk that an individual's immediate fate will be influenced by events
which have little relevance to his current situation or criminality increases
dramatically.
II
THE DEFINITION AND AVAILABILITY OF ARREST RECORDS
Any discussion of the use of arrest records in the exercise of police discre-
tion must begin with a definition of arrest records. Arrest records are those
records maintained by law enforcement agencies detailing incidents of arrest
or detention by police authorities. For purposes of this note, a paradigmatic
case is established: the individual who is arrested but is neither convicted nor
the beneficiary of a preprosecution diversion program. This model is utilized
because it represents the individual most likely to be harmed by the existence
and availability of arrest records. The problems associated with the use of
arrest records with regard to this individual are not unique, however, but are
applicable to some degree to all persons with prior arrest records.
Arrest records are normally available to law enforcement authorities.
Most legislatures have placed few, if any, meaningful limitations on access to
these records, 12 thereby accommodating the interests of law enforcement
agencies in maintaining and using records of arrest.' 3
Simultaneously, courts have taken a narrow view of their authority to
impose restrictions on access to and use of arrest records.' 4 In the absence of
legislatively mandated solutions, courts must rely on their equity powers,
9. See generally Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 126, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972); Smith, Weh-
meyer, Keating & Berberich, Background Information: Does It Affect the Misdemeanor Arrest ? 4 J. POL. Sci.
&AD. 111 (1976).
10. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
11. J. MURPHY, supra note 7, at 5.
12. See, e.g., State v. Nettles, 375 So. 2d 1339, 1341 (La. 1979).
13. Legislatures have become more sensitive to privacy interests in the last few years, creating
the potential for restricting the wide-open use of arrest records.
14. See. e.g., United States v. Singleton, 442 F. Supp. 722, 723 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
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which are used to address only the most blatant cases of abuse associated with
the records. In extreme cases, usually involving mass arrests or egregious
constitutional violations, courts have stepped in to assist an individual.' 5
Courts will usually order expungement of the record in such cases. 16 This
judicial power, though, is of limited value, since most courts agree with the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the power to expunge 'is a
narrow one, and should not be routinely used whenever a criminal prosecu-
tion ends in an acquittal but should be reserved for the unusual or extreme
case.' "',7 Thus, courts typically treat the expungement remedy as a narrow
and greatly circumscribed power. Even those courts which grant this remedy
more freely are limited in their ability to control the damage caused by these
records; because the dissemination of information in police records is so
widespread and so rapid, courts may not be able to undo all the harm, or even
the most significant harm, associated with the use of such records.' 8 In addi-
tion, some courts which permit expungement of arrest records put the burden
on the arrestee-defendant to prove affirmatively that he was not guilty of the
crime charged. 19
Courts thus continually condone the availability and use of arrest records.
Even in cases resulting in acquittal, courts often hold that arrestees are not
entitled to a return of their arrest records. 20 The records are therefore often
inaccurate indicators of criminality, and the criminal justice system, by making
the records freely available, perpetuates any misperceptions associated with
them.2 1
15. See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1970); In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d
803, 807 (Minn. 1977).
16. E.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (three-judge panel); Hughes v.
Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
17. United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Linn,
513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir.)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); see also United States v. Singleton,
442 F. Supp. 722, 729 (S.D. Tex. 1977); United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75, 78 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14, 17 (D.C. 1.971).
18. See, e.g., McKnight v. Webster, 499 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (inaccurate records
were in government files but no direct cause of action was permitted against the agency because it
did not generate the information).
19. See Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14, 19 (D.C. 197 1) (basis ofreliefis an uncontro-
verted showing of absence of culpability, as opposed to "mere exoneration"). The attitude of many
courts was summed up in People v. Griffin, 32 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29, 383 P.2d 432, 437 (1963): "An
acquittal is merely an adjudication that the proof at the prior proceeding was not sufficient to over-
come all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused."
20. See cases cited supra note 17; see also District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d 175, 179 (D.C.
1979).
21. The prior discussion focused on cases in which a record of arrest is created and no convic-
tion results. In contradistinction are those cases where no record is created because it serves some
purpose of a law enforcement agency. This event most often occurs when the police want an indi-
vidual to serve as an informant. Reiss, Discretinaryjustice in the United States, 2 INT'LJ. CRIMINOLOGY &
PENOLOGY 181, 193 (1974); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
493 (1965). In these situations, one major difficulty is that "above all there is an implied under-
standing between the policeman and the informant that the policeman will protect the informant's
criminal status." J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 132 (2d ed. 1975). Besides the questionable
desirability of having police protect criminal enterprises, there is the perverse result that known
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III
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH POLICE DISCRETION MAY BE EXERCISED
Traditionally, commentators have focused on the legitimacy, 22 efficacy, 23
or availability of police discretion. 24 But no study has examined the effects of
police discretion on either rates of criminality or the efficiency of law enforce-
ment agencies. To a large extent, this phenomenon may be a consequence of
the virtual "invisibility" of these discretionary actions; 25 few "beneficiaries" of
the exercise of discretion (individuals that are not arrested) would challenge
the decision of an officer to forego writing a ticket or to let a petty offender go
free, and most nonbeneficiaries (individuals that are arrested) are hard-
pressed to complain of their arrest for a crime if there is ample evidence to
support the charge and no intervening constitutional defect. 26 Yet, as has
long been recognized, the very exercise of discretion carries with it the possi-
bility of capriciousness and discrimination, since few external checks are avail-
able. Even when such checks are available, they are seldom truly effective in
the absence of expansive and costly supervision. 27
Field work presents the initial opportunity for an officer to exercise discre-
tion. The police officer at the street level is the first judge and jury for a
potential arrestee. 28 An individual may be ignored, merely warned, taken to
the station for a "talk," or arrested. The officer's ultimate decision is not
made in a vacuum, but rather depends upon a variety of factors including the
availability of witnesses, the existence and credibility of a complaining party, 29
the attitude of the suspect, the egregiousness of the offense, and the loca-
tion.30 Information available to an officer is therefore at a premium, and the
type and quality of information will influence, if not dictate, the decision
made. 31 The determination of whether the information used by the officer
should be restricted to what is available in the field or discoverable by
criminals are protected, both directly and indirectly by virtue of a clean record, while innocent indi-
viduals who are not useful as informants suffer the disabilities resulting from a criminal record.
While within the confines of a small town or a restricted area this distinction might not mean much,
given that the police will know the informant/criminal, the significance of this dichotomy is demon-
strated when individuals move somewhere else. In the new location where neither innocent arrestee
nor informant/criminal is known, authorities will have only their records on which to proceed. This
possibility of different treatment underscores the questionable validity of permitting arrest records to
influence police discretion.
22. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
23. See Reiss, supra note 21; see also Smith & Visher, Street-LevelJustice: Situational Determinants of
Police Arrest Decisions, 29 Soc. PROBS. 167 (1981).
24. Goldstein, supra note 5, at 543.
25. See id. at 552.
26. Prerequisites for a valid arrest include either the existence of probable cause or the observa-
tion of a crime by an officer. The former is problematic, as discussed later, since the constituent
parts of a probable cause finding may involve inappropriate factors.
27. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 136-37, 494.
28. See Davis, supra note 4, at 874.
29. See Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility Call, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1984, at 15.
30. Smith & Visher, supra note 23, at 168-69.
31. See generally Sullivan & Siegell, How Police Use Information to M'ake Decisions, 18 CRIME &
DELINQ. 253 (1972).
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detective work, or whether external information, such as the suspect's arrest
record, should also be utilized, necessarily affects the exercise of discretion.
The imposition of controls on an officer's personal knowledge cannot be real-
istically effected. Controlling an external factor such as the availability and
use of arrest records, however, can be done effectively and can have practical
significance.
The police may also exercise discretion with respect to internal dispostions
once an alleged offender is brought to the station house.3 2 The police may,
for example, accept information from the detainee and in exchange forego his
arrest, as is the case with informants. They may also decide not to file a
charge against a first-time juvenile offender. In other situations, police use a
trip to the station simply as a way of shaking up the detainee, hoping ulti-
mately to set him on a more law-abiding path. The variations are extensive,
and the situation not wholly different from the exercise of discretion in the
field. In both circumstances, the presence or absence of an arrest record may
influence the disposition of the matter.33
To a large extent, the conduct of an investigation is also a product of dis-
cretion. Police may choose not to emphasize the investigation of violations of
certain criminal statutes and, by benign neglect, affect the enforceability of
those laws. Officers may, as is the case with informants, choose to forego
arrest for promising leads on known offenders.34 While the conduct of inves-
tigations certainly relates to a number of different factors-including political
decisionmaking and public opinion-it is still, in the final analysis, a discre-
tionary activity of the police. 35
The use of discretion has the greatest significance at the point when the
police are prepared to take affirmative action against a suspect. Although the
initiation of arrest procedures might be thought to be mandatory at this point,
at least when a crime has been observed, this is apparently not the case. Dis-
cretion is exercised both when a crime is observed and when the police, by
investigation, have acquired enough information to have probable cause to
arrest: "At law in the United States, the police have the authority to decide
when there is probable or reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed. . . . Although the discretion to arrest is legally restricted, in
practice, when enforcing the law, the police exercise enormous discretion to
arrest." 36
32. See Monroe v. Tielsch, 84 Wash. 2d 217, 220, 525 P.2d 250, 251 (1974).
33. See, e.g., Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 866, 553 P.2d 624, 629, 132 Cal. Rptr.
464, 469 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977).
34. See Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 342-43, 487 P.2d 211, 216 (1971); Davidson v. Dill,
180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972).
35. See Goldstein, supra note 5, at 552; Reiss, supra note 21, at 192.
36. Reiss, supra note 21, at 191.
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IV
THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE
The finding of probable cause is the predicate to charging a suspect with
an offense. The availability of arrest records affects the exercise of discretion
in the determination of whether probable cause exists to the extent that it
affects the information available to an officer. Arrest records (as well as the
officer's personal knowledge) are therefore significant because they may swing
a decision in favor of finding probable cause. 37 An officer's finding of prob-
able cause and an arrest based on that finding should logically have value only
in the context of these initial events. Yet, subsequent arrests premised on a
prior arrest allow, in essence, a street-level review of the earlier disposition.
Although the existence of a prior arrest record alone is clearly insufficient to
make out probable cause, the weight given to such records is more than de
minimis. 38 Moreover, even if an individual is ultimately dismissed from police
custody with no formal charges having been brought, the arrest record
remains. The justification for the use of arrest records for purposes such as
the determination of probable cause is often based on the following premise:
With regard to the question whether the court properly considered information
regarding an arrest upon which no charges were filed, we recognize that an arrest,
without charge, trial, and conviction, is not proof of guilt. It is, however, evidence that
the arresting officer considered that he had probable cause to make the arrest. The
occurrence is one which has some relevance to the question before the court . . .39
The Supreme Court has been unclear regarding the weight properly given
to prior arrests in subsequent events. While the Court, in a case involving a
lawyer's admittance to a state bar association, stated that a prior arrest had no
probative value,40 federal courts have approved the use of prior arrests in a
number of different contexts, including sentencing, 4i bail, 42 and probable
cause hearings. 43 Even though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the propriety of the use of arrest records in the field, it is reasonable to
assume that their use would be upheld, given their accepted use in probable
cause hearings. Approval of an officer's use of personal knowledge in
securing a warrant also supports this conclusion. 44 Furthermore, since the
test for probable cause to arrest is the same as the probable cause standard
applied in a preliminary hearing, and since the latter permits the considera-
tion of inadmissible evidence, it is logical that in the former arrest records
37. W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 288.
38. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964); see also People v. Martin, 9 Cal. 3d 687, 511 P.2d
1161, 108 Cal. Rptr. 809, cert. denied, Martin v. California, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973).
39. State v. Dainard, 85 Wash. 2d 624, 628, 537 P.2d 760, 762 (1975); see also Jones v. United
States, 307 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert denied, 372 U.S. 919 (1963).
40. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957).
41. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); see alsoJones v. United States, 307 F.2d 190, cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 919 (1963).
42. Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1960).
43. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
44. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (plurality decision). For data concerning the
use of records in probable cause determinations, see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
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should be an acceptable factor for consideration. 45 In addition to the federal
cases, numerous state court decisions have implicitly approved the use of
arrest records in field-level determinations of probable cause. 46
Police agencies have clearly taken advantage of the implicit authorization
to use arrest records, and some agencies have codified this implied power. A
model handbook developed under the auspices of the now defunct Law
Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) states: "A person's previous record
can be considered along with other information in determining if there is
probable cause to arrest him for a particular crime. . . . [I]nformation may be
combined with a person's record to give probable cause."' 47  This policy is
also embodied in the Model Rules for Arrests developed by the Project on
Law Enforcement Policy,48 which provides that: "Some of the purposes for
which release of arrest and conviction information may be made to criminal
justice personnel are: (i) in deciding whether to charge an individual with an
offense; . . . (iii) in deciding whether to arrest or to summon .... "49
Even more important than the existence of such authorizations to use
arrest records in the exercise of police discretion are the indications that
arrest records actually do affect its exercise. A study of officers in Bellevue,
Washington, found that with respect to misdemeanant offenders: "When the
officer received unfavorable information [defined as information revealing
prior arrests exclusive of traffic and juvenile drunk and disorderly offenses] he
was more likely to complete an arrest than when he received favorable infor-
mation."' 50 The researchers actually found the disparity to be quite signifi-
cant, concluding: "[G]iven a misdemeanant crime situation in which the
officer has marginal probable cause to make an arrest, the decision to arrest or
release is decidedly influenced by the background information supplied to
that officer through record checks. 5'
Two other studies support the findings of the Bellevue project. The first
study observed officers in the field and found that, while a variety of factors
influence the charging decision, the existence or lack of prior arrests had a
45. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 989-90 (5th ed.
1980).
46. See, e.g., People v. Buchanan, 26 Cal. App. 3d 274, 103 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1972) (use of prior
arrests in probable cause decisions); State v. Nettles, 375 So. 2d 1339 (La. 1979) (use of prior arrests
in bond decisions); People v. Morales, 259 Cal. App: 2d 290, 66 Cal. Rptr. 234 (personal knowledge
of officer about defendant relevant), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 988 (1968). One court has stated: "At the
very least, the suspicion thus focused will justify additional investigation. If it is coupled with
independent evidence of criminal involvement it may amount to probable cause to arrest .... "
Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 866, 553 P.2d 624, 629, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 469 (1976).
47. L. SCHWARTZ & S. GOLDSTEIN, POLICE GUIDANCE MANUALS: A PHILADELPHIA MODEL 24
(1968).
48. MODEL RULES: RELEASE OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS (Project on Law Enforcement
Policy and Rulemaking 1974).
49. Id. at 23.
50. Smith, Wehmeyer, Keating & Berberich, supra note 9, at 113. Admittedly, other factors such
as the race and attitude of the potential arrestee, as well as the officer's experience, may affect the
officer's determination. See Pepinsky, Better Living Through Police Discretion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1984, at 249.
51. Smith, Wehmeyer, Keating & Berberich, supra note 9, at 113.
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substantial impact on the officers' decisions. 52 The second study, which
focused on the decisionmaking of officers with differing experience and back-
grounds, found that most officers give even greater weight to arrest records
than to their own personal knowledge about a suspect. 53 These studies are
not determinative across localities, nor in their application to all types of
offenses. The results are instructive, nonetheless, since they substantiate what
has long been presumed-that police officers use prior arrest records as a
determinant in arrest and charging decisions.
It is apparent that police officers do not feel restrained in their utilization
of arrest records since their use is explicitly advocated by law enforcement
agencies and implicitly sanctioned by the courts. Arrest records, though, are
not a product of investigatory work relating to the crime at hand. Rather, they
are independent and, usually, unrelated to the offense. Discretion is thus
influenced by the entirely external factor of arrest records which, as will be
shown, may not have any real significance to the criminality of the individual
under investigation.
V
THE PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF ARREST RECORDS
The significance of a record of arrest can vary greatly from case to case,
since the record can result from a number of very different dispositions. A
detainee may be arrested and convicted, arrested with probable cause but not
convicted, or arrested without probable cause and not convicted-as in
dragnet or mass arrest cases-or arrested and not convicted because of some
technical problem involving the exclusionary rule. 54 Society, however, gives
great weight to the mere occurrence of an arrest.55 The types of inquiries
made on job forms and license applications evince this social emphasis. 56
Inevitably, few individuals and institutions distinguish among the various
arrest contexts. Even the arrest records themselves may not accurately reflect
the disposition of the case; nor will they recount special circumstances of the
arrest, as in cases of unconstitutional dragnet arrests, constitutionally ques-
tionable mass arrests, arrests made for the purpose of harrassment, and
arrests used as a show of force by the police. 57 Even if these incidents of
arrest constitute a small percentage of all arrests, they pose a very real
problem to the individuals whose records and reputations are directly
involved.
The well-recognized fact that many cases never make it past the arrest or
52. Pope, Postarrest Release Decisions: An Empirical Examination of Social and Legal Criteria, 15 J.
RESEARCH ON CRIME & DELINQ. 35, 48 (1978).
53. Sullivan & Siegel, supra note 31, at 262.
54. For an extended discussion of the impact of the exclusionary rule, see Y. KAmISAR, W.
LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 34, ch. 11.
55. See Pope, supra note 52.
56. A typical job application form includes the question "Have you ever been arrested?
Explain," without room for much more than the "Yes" or "No."
57. Goldstein, supra note 5, at 580.
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indictment stage calls into question the meaningfulness of the records. There
are substantial numbers of arrests which are terminated by release from police
custody because the case is not strong enough, the effort needed to prosecute
is not worth the return, or the police recognize a fatal illegality in their
actions. 58 In other cases, the prosecutor may decide to terminate the matter
for similar reasons. In each of these circumstances, although the arrestee
never goes to trial or pleads guilty, the record remains.
The maintenance of arrest records should have some empirically valid pur-
pose in order to justify the records' negative consequences. Since arrest
records are kept, at least theoretically, for valid law enforcement purposes, 59
they should produce some tangible benefit to the criminal justice scheme.
Ideally, the records should aid in detecting and predicting the incidence of
criminality for those with prior arrests. In the absence of some such predic-
tive validity, the records have purely arbitrary consequences since individuals
immortalized in the records are associated with the "criminal files" regardless
of their criminality. 60
Data on the predictive value of arrest records are scant. 6' Studies of
arrests usually are tied to studies of convictions, making it difficult to ascertain
58. In one jurisdiction, it was found that the police released 50% of all arrestees at the sta-
tionhouse. See T. BALLINGER, supra note 1, at 31.
59. See supra note 54.
60. See T. BALLINGER, supra note 1, at 51; see also United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970
(D.P.R. 1967) (arrest records are part of "criminal" identification records).
61. Some general information on the significance and meaning of arrests is available in the area
of parole prediction studies. Before discussing some of these studies, however, it is important to
note that they suffer from one major flaw-they are geared toward determining whether potential
parolees (i.e., persons convicted of a crime and incarcerated) are good parole risks. Consequently, the
results may not be very instructive for the paradigmatic case posited in part II of this note. See supra
notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
One general survey of the most widely used prediction models found that prior arrests were not
considered a primary or important factor in developing a predictive scale. See VIRGINIA DEP'T OF
CORRECTIONS, CRIMINALJUSTICE PREDICTION SCALES (1978). Among the scales which attached signif-
icance to prior arrests, the longest period of time considered significant was five years-that is, if the
individual was arrested more than five years prior to the arrest leading to incarceration, the arrest
was not included as a predictive factor. In the NCCD Base Expectancy Scale (BES), being arrest-free
for five or more years correlated to the highest positive score on a scale totalling 100. Both scales are
methods of predicting parole success with regard to the chances of rehabilitation or recidivism. The
higher the score, the less likelihood of recidivism. Id. at 6.
Extensive studies of the California BES have been conducted by Donald Gottfredson, individually
and with others. The early Gottfredson studies found that the percentage of nonrecidivists in a pool
of parolees decreased with any previous arrest history, D. GOTFFREDSON, BASE EXPECTANCY IN THE
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN (Cal. Dep't of Corrections 1962), and that parole violators were
likely to have had more prior arrests, commitments, and incarcerations. D. GOTrFREDSON & J.
BONDS, A MANUAL FOR INTAKE BASE EXPECTANCY SCORES (Cal. Dep't of Corrections 1981). In
another study, Gottfredson and Bonds made the salient point that at least some prior arrests without
conviction have predictive validity since the reason no conviction appears might be that the prose-
cutor chose to conserve judicial resources by substituting penalites (for example, reincarceration on
a parole violation rather than a trial on the new offense). D. GOTrFREDSON & J. BONDS, SYSTEMATIC
STUDY OF EXPERIENCE AS AN AID TO DECISIONS (Cal. Dep't of Corrections 1961). Despite the above
studies, in a 1978 parole guidelines development project for the National Institute of Legal Educa-
tion and Criminal Justice, Gottfredson (along with Leslie Wilkens) did not mention arrests as an
"important" or "essential" element. D. GOTrFREDSON & L. WILKINS, GUIDELINES FOR GUIDELINE
DEVELOPMENT, CLASSIFICATION FOR PAROLE DECISION POLICY (1978).
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the independent significance of either factor. While arrest records are said to
have a valid law enforcement purpose, such a purpose has not been empiri-
cally demonstrated, and the justifications for the maintenance and use of
these records consequently appear somewhat spurious.
The study of pretrial releases and preventive detention practices provides
some information about the validity of prior arrests as a factor influencing
judicial decisions. 62 Preventive detention programs are designed to deter-
mine whether an arrested individual is potentially dangerous for purposes of
denying bail or, in the other extreme, for permitting release on personal
recognizance. Senator Sam Ervin, in his foreword to a study of preventive
detention in the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, found the prac-
tice of preventive detention both questionable in its effectiveness and consti-
tutionally suspect. 63 Senator Ervin found that none of the variable factors-
including arrest records-was a reliable predictor of criminality, and that the
practice of distinguishing among individuals on the basis of such factors
raised equal protection and due process concerns. 64
The Harvard study found that the ability to identify violent offenders, the
ostensible goal of preventive detention, was not easily attainable. For
example, if the Washington, D.C., preventive detention criteria were used in
Boston, the identification of violent offenders would not have been affected
significantly. 65 Since the criteria included an analysis of past arrests, one pos-
sible conclusion is that such arrests do not indicate with sufficient certainty
that individuals are more prone to criminality. Consequently, the entire prac-
tice of utilizing prior arrests as a factor in judicial decisions is of questionable
value.
Law enforcement agencies continue to advocate the utilization of arrest
records by police officers despite the fact that empirically based materials
appear to discount the importance of prior arrests. 66 The studies that do give
62. See, e.g., N. BASES & W. MCDONALD, PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
THE FIRST TEN MONTHS (1972); Note, Preventive Detention, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 300 (1971).
63. Ervin, Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 291 (1971).
64. Id. at 295, 298.
65. See id. The Vera Foundation studies criminal justice processes and procedures and recom-
mends modificaitons. See N. BASES & W. McDONALD, supra note 62. The Foundation's finding that
preventive detention is used infrequently leads to the conclusion that the need for such a device is
minimal. In turn, the underlying bases-such as arrest records-for preventive detention decisions
are also suspect since they should be the rationale for the detention of an individual. See id. at 72.
The Foundation also poses the question whether preventive detention programs may lead to
overcharging. See id. at 95. Overcharging leads to even greater unfairness to individuals with arrest
records.
Bail systems test the theoretical constructs governing treatment of individuals arrested but not yet
tried. In this regard, the factors used to determine eligibility for bail should track those characteris-
tics which most strongly indicate a high degree of risk. For example, in the Vera Foundation's Man-
hattan Bail Project, prior arrests are not a consideration in determining eligibility for the program.
Rather, the project concentrates on prior convictions and the nature of the crimes underlying the
convictions. See D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 56-59 (1964).
66. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text; see also D. GOTrFREDSON & K. BALLARD, REPORT
No. 4 (Institute for the Study of Crime and Delinquency 1964) (stating that there is a consensus in
some circles that prior arrests are a "quite important" factor for parole predictions).
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some significance to these arrests are older and many have been supplanted
by newer studies reaching opposite conclusions. This conflicting information
makes the policymaker's decision as to how to reevaluate the use of arrest
records a difficult one indeed.
VI
THE IMPLICATIONS OF PERMITTING THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS
The cases which comprise the factual details of arrest records are subject
to a wide array of dispositions involving no finding of guilt, ranging from
release without charging to acquittal. Although the contexts in which
arrestees are released vary, the records all carry the same implications. Con-
sistent with this concern, one court has declared:
For the person who has been arrested and exonerated, the presumption of innocence
is lost. He stands at a distinct disadvantage to other, also presumably innocent, citi-
zens who do not have a 'record.' Though he has been found innocent of any wrong-
doing, the record will remain as a cloud over his future, put there and maintained by
the same system of justice that exonerated him.6 7
The "cloud" extends because, while the courts are governed by a pre-
sumption of innocence, societal attitudes are not. An arrest is "distinct from
other interactions between citizens and police" because it is the first stage of a
potential criminal prosecution. 68 Consequently, the existence of an arrest
record in this society suggests guilt, even when the individual is not found
guilty. 69 Courts exacerbate the problem by generally providing remedies,
such as expungement, only to those who affirmatively prove their inno-
cence. 70 For all practical purposes, as far as the use of records is concerned,
an arrest is equivalent to a conviction. The traditional presumption of inno-
cence loses meaning, even in the courtroom, 7' and the innocent individual
who falls by chance into the criminal justice system suffers many of the same
disabilities as the career criminal. The individual may even have to relive this
traumatic event, if cross-examined about it as a witness in a subsequent trial. 72
The case law and literature are replete with examples of individuals suf-
fering from the mere fact of having a record of arrest. Some of the most
noteworthy cases arise in the areas of jobs73 and licensing.74 Moreover, the
individual arrested suffers from a social stigma. This, admittedly, cannot be
67. United States v. Singleton, 442 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
68. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
69. See Hess & Le Poole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME & DELINQ.
494, 495-96 (1967).
70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
71. One recent study reported in the popular press found that the fact that a defendant has been
arrested and is standing trial will cause juries to lean toward a guilty verdict. The study, conducted
by Norman Bregman, found that people believe that the initial trial of someone suggests that the
-guy must be guilty of something." Durham Morning Herald, Aug. 26, 1984, at 14A.
72. Michaelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1948).
73. Courts are aware of the potential for lost economic opportunities for youths who have arrest
records. See, e.g., Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1234-38 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Applications for jobs
will often inquire about arrests and a record will frequently be "a substantial barrier to employ-
ment." Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Economic opportunities are lost as
[Vol. 47: No. 4
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erased by the mere sealing or expungement of records. 75 Most important,
though, the fact that an individual has been arrested makes him a likely candi-
date for future police contacts. On this point, the Colorado Supreme Court
remarked: "[I]t is common knowledge that a man with an arrest record is
much more apt to be subject to police scrutiny-the first to be questioned and
the last eliminated as a suspect in an investigation. If he is subsequently
arrested, his arrest record may arise to haunt him. .. ,"76 A vicious cycle for
the individual may thus begin; each subsequent arrest adds to the suspicion
with which authorities regard the individual. The virtual absence of a means
of eliminating these records, given the paucity of expungement procedures,
amounts to a terminal commitment of the individual to the criminal justice
system.
77
Some may argue that police behavior like that described above is a com-
pletely reasonable response. This proposition is dubious, however, in light of
the fact that the targeted individual may never have been convicted of a crime
and might have been the victim of a mistaken identification or, worse yet, a
malicious investigation. Police discretion influenced by this type of informa-
tion is misguided and out of place in a society that extols the virtues of due
process. Admittedly, discretion has a role in the enforcement of laws; never-
theless, its exercise should not be based on grossly misleading information.
When officers exercise discretion in a system based on stored information
which is possibly incorrect, rather than on their own perceptions of events,
a result of the mere fact of arrest; subsequent acquittal does not seem to remove the stigma. See
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970), on remand, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
74. See Menards v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Applications for professional
licenses will often inquire into the arrest history of an individual. In professions which strictly scruti-
nize the "morals" of an individual, as is the practice of many state bar associatons, it seems very likely
that an arrest record could have a deleterious effect on an individual's application to practice within
the profession.
75. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
76. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972) (citing United States v.
Cifarelli, 401 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1968)). Harm in noncriminal contexts involves the poetntial for
termination of employment or refusal of employment, lowered credit ratings, and a general social
stigma. In the "criminal context," the arrestee is subject to greater scrutiny because he is known to
the police, who maintain physical records about the individual. As a consequence, the individual
loses a great deal of his privacy: "An individual who has been arrested and then acquitted has an
undeniably greater visibility to the police than other persons. His fingerprints, and more particularly
his photograph, are available to be shown to other citizens as a potential suspect to be chosen in
prearrest lineups .... ." Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 344, 487 P.2d 211, 216 (1971). This
scrutiny is increased when the arrestee is alleged to have used a particular modus operandi or has a
unique physical characteristic. Moreover, in close cases, the fact of a prior arrest may tip the scales,
irrespective of the probable cause considerations, toward making an arrest: "An arrest record may
be used by the police in determining whether subsequently to arrest the individual concerned, or
whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal charges against an individual already arrested."
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77. As one court noted, "Although never found guilty of a crime, the constitutional benchmark
to the infliction of punishment, a person who becomes entangled with the criminal justice system is
forever unable to extricate himself even if completely exonerated." United States v. Benlizar, 459 F.
Supp. 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1978). This result seems unacceptable in light of another court's conclu-
sion that "a collection of dismissed, abandoned or withdrawn arrest records are no more than gutter
rumors when measured against any standards of constitutional fairness to an individual ....
United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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there is great potential for harm to the individual who has no effective way to
counteract the source of information. 78
The problems associated with arrest records are likely to expand in the
wake of increasing computerization and ease of access to data banks. 79 The
NCIC files are accessible to law enforcement agencies nationwide and many
states are now also maintaining extensive files.8 0 Modern computers allow
information to be conveyed to the officer in the field almost instantaneously.
Eventual reliance on computer consoles in police cars does not seem unreal-
istic. Obviously, this procedure would be useful and appropriate for deter-
mining the existence of outstanding warrants and related items; however,
arrest record information would also be easily accessible. Given the prejudi-
cial nature of arrest records, limiting access to them may be an appropriate
response.
The issue of access is fundamentally one of value choices. Cogent argu-
ments are made to justify easy access to arrest records by police officers.
Despite the difficulty in empirically demonstrating the validity of these argu-
ments, law enforcement authorities are understandably concerned that they
not be cut off completely from this type of information. On the other hand,
law enforcement authorities who think they have a need for these records
cannot simply abrogate the interests of innocent individuals. Consequently,
solutions accounting for the interests of both individuals and law enforcement
agencies are required.
VII
CONCLUSION: SOME QUESTIONS, SOME ANSWERS, SOME UNKNOWNS
The reference to arrest records in the NCIC system as "criminal
records"8 ' is indicative of the prevalent perception of the meaning of arrests.
Knowing that this perception is widespread, law enforcement agencies have a
responsibility to ensure that the records themselves do not further distort.
Law enforcement agencies must, at a minimum, act to ensure that the records
are accurate and up-to-date; this should include, at least, noting the disposi-
tions of prior arrests. Unfortunately, this is no easy task, given the multitude
of jurisdictions and the widespread confusion over the responsibility for the
accuracy of records.8 2
78. See Murphy, supra note 7, at xi. Murphy also briefly discusses the privacy issues relating to
arrest records and instantaneous access by police officers in the field. Id. This dimension of the
problem merits further study, but is beyond the scope of this note.
79. See Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
80. In California, 1.5 million arrest records are created every year. T. BALLINGER, supra note 1,
at 3 1. Most states maintain a bureau responsible for the maintenance of criminal records and related
materials.
81. United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.P.R. 1967).
82. The FBI maintains centralized criminal record files and receives its information from fed-
eral, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The FBI generally is not responsible for correcting
the information received unless the supplying agency forwards to it the corrected information.
McKnight v. Webster, 499 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The FBI is only responsible for
correcting files on its own when the information is obviously incorrect. Shadd v. United States, 389
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To address properly the issues surrounding the impact of arrest records
on the exercise of police discretion, an attempt to answer the following empir-
ically based questions must be made:
1. How significant is the existence of a prior arrest record in the decision to detain or
arrest an individual suspected of a crime (i.e., how do arrest records interact with
other factors affecting discretion)?
2. How does the predictive validity of the prior arrest record compare with other
potential criteria which influence the exercise of discretion?
3. What probative value do prior arrests have in terms of past or future criminality?
4. What predictive value do prior arrests have with respect to the future criminality
of persons convicted of a crime?
The answers to these questions will influence the value choices made with
respect to the latitude police have in making arrest decisions. Unlike the sug-
gestions that records be complete, accurate, and up-to-date, which are likely
to raise only administrative concerns, attempts to restrict the accessibility of
arrest records to law enforcement agencies and/or officers in the field will
receive strong opposition. A starting point for the debate may be the differ-
entiation between arrests and convictions, since the latter have much greater
significance. Nonetheless, even prior convictions may not always be either
very informative (when pardon has been granted, for example 83) or a valid
influence in deciding whether a suspect committed a present offense. For the
paradigmatic case of the individual who is arrested but is neither convicted
nor the beneficiary of a preprosecution diversion program,8 4 however, the
problem of prior convictions or diversions is obviously not a factor. While no
numbers are available on this specific cohort, given the millions of arrests and
the multiplicity of record-keeping entities, it is likely that the group is quite
large.
Three alternatives to the status quo are possible and workable. First,
records with arrests but no convictions could be expunged. Unfortunately,
while this alternative is the best approach for the arrestee, it is the most
unlikely to be accepted by police authorities. Second, a time limit-five years,
for example-could be placed on the maintenance of records of prior arrests
in active files. Thereafter, the records would be either sealed or expunged. In
the event of sealing, the records would be available only after subsequent
arrests. The time period would match the length of arrest-free periods
thought significant by the various parole predictive studies,8 5 which offer a
basis of comparison with a known standard. The time period might be shorter
for records containing only arrests than for those also containing convictions.
F. Supp. 721, 724 (W.D. Pa. 1975), affd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
887 (1976). Thus, if a local agency fails to provide updated information to the FBI, the files at the
FBI may differ from the state or local files. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that state and
local agencies often maintain separate files.
83. See People v. Glisson, 44 Ill. App. 3d 108, 358 N.E.2d 35 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 69
I11. 2d 502, N.E.2d 669 (1978) (pardoned individual treated as if never convicted). But see City of St.
Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 246 N.W.2d 435, 438-39 (1976) (pardon does not eliminate occur-
rence of conviction and thus record can be used).
84. See supra p. 289.
85. See supra note 66.
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The third alternative is to restrict the availability of the arrest records
within police departments. Only senior administrators would have access to
the information and the various data bases containing the information could
be programmed with this restriction. By eliminating the accessibility of the
records to officers in the field, there would be less likelihood that this informa-
tion would constitute part of a probable cause determination. Distinctions
could be made between records with arrests only and those with convictions,
with the latter being made more accessible. The objective of this alternative
would be to channel discretion in a manner which gives greater weight to
observed or investigatively determined factors than to external information
sources of questionable reliability. This alternative would also give police
administrators greater control. 86
The efficacy of these solutions is only provable with longitudinal studies
which track the nature of the exercise of discretionary authority in the field
and which, as done in Bellevue, seek to break out the factor of prior arrests
from other potential situational determinants. These studies should seek to
answer the questions posed earlier in this note concerning the predictive
value of the records. In light of these studies, though, there will be a contin-
uing need to decide whether society wishes to move along the continuum
toward either the Due Process model or the Crime Control model. While the
outcome of these studies will not be determinative as to the direction chosen,
the studies will permit a more informed discussion and will help guide the
debate towards a rational balance between the legitimate concerns of law
enforcement agencies and the constitutional guarantees underlying the crim-
inal justice system.
86. Actually, a fourth alternative exists which is concerned with general police authority. This
approach would give police agencies greater leeway to release individuals after charging when no
further evidence is developed. While at first this plan might appear to increase discretion in a less
palatable manner, such a device, if coupled with appropriate rules, might channel police discretion
more effectively. If combined with a rule requiring accurate notations on the records as to the rea-
sons for release, fewer ambigious records would result and individuals would, at least, have the ben-
efit of a potentially expedited system. While complete discussion of this alternative is beyond the
scope of this note, the fourth option is mentioned to suggest the existence of a myriad of creative and
potentially effective alternatives to discretion based on presently questionable criteria. See aLso
Uviller, supra note 29, at 315 (discussion on the related concept of the individual officer's authority to
decline to arrest when he has an articulable reason for taking this course).
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